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Under the background of highly concentrated ownership structure in China, listed 
companies are under the control of controlling shareholders in fact.  In order to 
maximize their self-interests, the controlling shareholders of listed companies 
dominate companies’ operating policies and the business activities of listed companies 
are affected seriously. Connection transaction has the characteristics of unfairness and 
secretiveness, so it becomes the principal means of controlling shareholders’ 
deprivation. Due to the dominance of state-owned feature, how to inhibit controlling 
shareholders’ deprivation and protect the minority interests becomes one of the most 
urgent problems in Chinese securities market that are needed to be solved recently.  
The root cause of why controlling shareholders deprive interests of monitory 
shareholders is the information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. This paper analyzed controlling shareholders’ deprivation 
activities in connection transaction just from the perspective of information 
asymmetry and contract incompleteness. Firstly, this paper introduced the definition 
of connection transaction, then proposed and analyzed the cost of controlling 
shareholders’ deprivation activities needed to be spent during the deprivation, 
applying Coase Transaction Cost Theory. Secondly, the paper expatiated the specific 
performance means of controlling shareholders’ deprivation activities in connection 
transaction and emphasized seriousness of controlling shareholders’ deprivation 
activities led by the particularity of ownership structures, corporate governance 
mechanisms and legal environment in China, and analyzed the motivation of 
controlling shareholders’ deprivation activities deeply from the perspective of 
information asymmetry and contract incompleteness. Then, there was a further 
analysis of specific performance of controlling shareholders’ deprivation activities 
with actual cases, and the conclusions were that because of the special internal and 
external environment where controlling shareholders of listed companies are in China, 
the cost of controlling shareholders’ deprivation activities was lower and controlling 














shareholders was more serious in China. Lastly, based upon above analysis, the 
relative policies proposals are proposed from aspects of external supervision and 
internal governance of listed companies. 
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的而是相当集中的(Laporta 等(1999a)；Faccio 和 Lang(2002)；Franks 和
Mayer(2001))，在企业系族存在终极控制性股东。即使在美国，也可以发现几百





道挖掘”（Tunneling）。2001 年 12 月 2 日，能源巨人美国安然公司正式向纽约
破产法院申请破产保护，在 1997 年到 2000 年间，安然因关联交易共虚报了 5.52
































开始以往来款挂账的方式大肆从 ST 猴王拿钱。资料显示，上市仅一年多，ST 猴
王的应收款项就已高达 5亿元，而直至 2000 年中期，ST 猴王一直没有一块明确
属于自己的资产
[3]
。东盛科技（600771）2006 年 10 月 31 日告称，公司股东东盛
集团、东盛药业共占用公司资金 158826 万元，其中东盛集团占用 113910 万元，
东盛药业占用 44916 万元。除此之外，东盛科技还违规对外担保了巨额资金。公
告显示，截至 2006 年 9 月 30 日，东盛科技累计对外担保 113434.83 万元，占该
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